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Abstract 
 
High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, 
and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel 
specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to 
undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional 
environment the corruptible employee’s or official’s decision to engage in corruption is affected 
by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost 
of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing 
those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher 
government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other 
findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from 
long-run joint causation by unobserved factors. 
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I. Introduction 
Academics and practitioners alike lavish attention on corruption, commonly defined as the 
misuse of public office for private gain. The misuse of political and administrative power at the 
expense of citizens remains a problem in developing and developed democracies alike. The 
abuse of office takes many forms, from receiving direct payments for political favors to election 
tampering to enacting legislation or otherwise channeling public money for private benefit to 
groups of friends, clients, supporters, or voters. Quintessentially, corruption is about taking 
payment for an illegal act, or somehow inappropriately enriching oneself from the public purse. 
A very large literature has investigated the political, cultural, historical, and economic 
determinants of corruption. A much smaller, micro-based literature, on which we build, 
considers how an elected or publicly employed agent’s key choices over alternative income 
sources affect the decision to act corruptly.1 
A frequent empirical finding is that greater economic inequality is associated with greater 
corruption. Here, inequality is a sign of poverty: poorer publicly employed agents have greater 
incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. Thus, Paldam (2002) writes that income inequality 
increases “… the temptation to make illicit gains.” As a consequence, higher inequality is widely 
believed to be associated with higher levels of corruption, as when Rose-Ackerman (2004: 11) 
argues that “in democracies in particular, inequality facilitates corruption, a result consistent with 
the state capture variant of corruption.” You and Khagram (2005) argue that there is a “norm” of 
expecting and tolerating corruption where inequality is high (see also Uslaner, 2008).2  
                                                 
1 Recent comparative (Treisman 2007) and American (Glaeser and Saks 2006) studies find that corruption has no 
effect on economic growth, despite a large earlier literature to the contrary. While in the states corruption may affect 
borrowing costs (Depken and LaFountain 2006), we leave the consequences of corruption for another paper. 
2 You and Khagram (2005) argue that the norm arises because inequality means that when the rich have more 
resources to lobby and/or act corruptly, there is less of a middle class to resist corruption, while the poor only 
observe corruption in society. 
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Instead, our theoretical starting point is the factors that influence the individual decision 
to take money from corrupt as opposed to legal activities. Becker and Stigler (1974), and more 
recently Besley and McLaren (1993) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) among others, 
model a publicly employed agent who, at the margin, compares the size of the rents from illegal 
activities, allowing for the probability of being investigated, detected, charged, convicted, jailed, 
expelled from public service, and therefore compelled to earn a living privately, with the income 
from continuing to work legally in the public sector.3 We show how the relationship between 
inequality and both government wages and private sector wages affect the calculus of corruption. 
We generate two testable, related hypotheses: first, that higher relative government wages 
decreases corruption, and second, that greater inequality (through the effect of wages in 
alternative employment) also decreases corruption. We support these claims empirically. 
By contrast, You and Khagram (2005) find empirical support for a positive relationship 
between income inequality and corruption using data from a cross-section of countries. Glaeser 
and Saks (2006) find the same empirical result for a cross-section of US states.4  However, 
Treisman (2007: 239) writes of looking for   
… evidence of a link between corruption perceptions and both income inequality 
(measured in various ways) and the relative wage in the public sector …. These 
were not generally significant in regressions that included basic controls. 
We show that both those variables are indeed significant. Using high quality panel data to 
distinguish short and long run effects of changes in relative income streams and wage inequality 
                                                 
3 We focus on government wages. In Becker and Stigler, it is optimal to set government wages above private sector 
wages, as the wage premium discourages corruption in an efficiency wage fashion. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001) give supporting empirical evidence for this effect in a cross-section of countries. 
4 You and Khagram and Glaeser and Saks use multi-year averages to take out noise from the dependent variable, so 
all their estimates are ultimately cross-sectional. Not everyone finds these patterns – Park (2003) and Brown et al. 
(2005) find no evidence that greater inequality increases corruption. 
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on corruption, we find some evidence of long-run joint drift of inequality and corruption, but that 
the short-run, causal effect of inequality on corruption is negative, as is the effect of relative 
government wages. These results, with more inequality leading to fewer corruption convictions, 
reflect the importance of accounting for time trends or year effects and unit fixed effects, and 
hold up even while controlling for factors from the other literature reviewed below.  
We take those controls from recent cross-national empirical research that examines how 
not only income and other social factors but also political factors like judicial independence, 
federal regimes, or electoral institutions (district magnitude, ballot structure, open list voting) 
shape the incentives for politicians to engage in illegal rent-seeking and corrupt activities. 5  
Where appropriate, many findings of this comparative work have already been incorporated in 
research on American state governments (Adserà et al. 2003; Alt and Lassen 2003, 2008; Glaeser 
and Saks 2006; Maxwell and Winters 2005). We extend this literature by using data from 
American states in this investigation.  
By cross-national standards the US states are a sample with relatively high incomes and 
established democracy and rule of law, and we return to the implications of this below. 
Nevertheless, three strong advantages of studying them are: we now have a reliable panel of 
corruption data covering a quarter of a century which does not rely on surveys or expert opinions; 
we also have better data for inequality and relative public sector salaries than do the cross-
country studies we review below; and, most of all, enforcement potential across units, important 
once the probability of detection is considered, is at least exogenous, and perhaps roughly 
constant across states if not over time; we evaluate this last claim empirically below. 
                                                 
5 See Ades and di Tella 1999; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Seldadyo and de Haan 2005; and Treisman 2000, 2007, 
and more specifically on institutions La Porta et al. 2004; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; and Brown et al. 2006. 
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 The next section presents our theoretical framework and empirical hypotheses. The third 
section describes data and estimation strategy. Section four presents results, considering 
alternative indicators and specifications. Section five concludes. 
II. Relative wages, wage inequality, and corruption: the core argument 
One way to counter the temptation of corruption among public officials and employees is to 
increase the wage rate paid to the official. This efficiency wage result was derived in the context 
of bribery of law enforcers by Becker and Stigler (1974). Theoretically it has been critically 
analyzed and extended by Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Ades 
and di Tella (1999), among others.6  
 The basic Becker-Stigler argument is that a government employee maximizes the present 
discounted value of a stream of expected income. A government employee contemplating a 
corrupt act can end up in three situations. First, if no corrupt act is committed, the employee 
simply receives his wage. Second, if he engages in corruption but is not detected, he receives 
both the wage and the bribe. Third, if he engages in corruption and is detected and sentenced he 
receives neither the wage nor the bribe, but incurs a penalty and is fired from public employment. 
In this case, future income is generally assumed to derive from employment in the private sector.  
 Consequently, for a given institutional environment, the corruptible employee’s or 
official’s decision to engage in corruption is affected by wages and expected tenure in the public 
sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and wages in the private 
sector conditional on having been caught for corruption. Becker and Stigler show that in their 
environment, setting a public sector wage above the market clearing wage decreases the 
                                                 
6 Polinsky and Shavell (2001) analyze a more general model, where public employees can also engage in extortion. 
Besley and McLaren (1993) and Ades and di Tella (1999) assume that employees differ in their intrinsic honesty. 
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propensity of the public employee to engage in corrupt behavior, a now standard efficiency wage 
result. As noted above, this hypothesis has received some empirical support: Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2001) find, in a cross-country analysis, that countries with higher average 
government wages relative to average wages in the manufacturing sector have less corruption as 
measured by expert surveys. di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) show, in a detailed analysis of 
corruption at hospitals in Buenos Aires, that higher wages in periods of less than maximal 
monitoring decreased corruption, while higher wages had no effect under maximal enforcement, 
as suggested by the Becker-Stigler model. Using higher government wages as a carrot thus 
seems to lower corruption.7 
 This paper focuses on the stick as well as the carrot. In addition to enforcement and 
sentencing, an important part of the government employee’s calculus of corruption is the 
expected wage in employment following job termination that results from sentencing or plea 
bargaining in corruption cases. In our view, a public employee convicted of corruption would not 
subsequently be employed at the average private sector wage: we assume that on average they 
would return at below-average wages. In standard efficiency wage models, lower wages upon 
termination from government employment decreases the expected present value of discounted 
lifetime earnings resulting from choosing to be corrupt. This reduces, for given values of public 
sector wages, bribes, and enforcement, the temptation to engage in corrupt behavior.8  
 Therefore, we need to look more closely at the wage structure actually facing government 
employees terminated from their jobs due to corruption charges or sentences. We cannot observe 
                                                 
7 However, other studies do not confirm this (Gurgur and Shah 2005; Treisman 2000), maybe because government 
wages correlate with measures of the rule of law and (of course) the quality of the bureaucracy. The level of 
government wages could also correlate with aspects of the overall income distribution like inequality.  
8 This implies that comparisons to average wages in the manufacturing sector, as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001), or to per capita GDP, as in Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997), may capture an occupational choice between the 
private and public sectors, to which we return below, rather than the threat from terminated employment. 
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this expected wage, and people at different points in the public sector wage distribution will 
presumably enter the private sector wage distribution at different points. Moreover, a more 
unequal wage distribution will tend to increase the distance (in dollars) between different 
percentiles in the wage distribution. In addition, just as the average private sector wage will vary 
between localities, so will other percentiles in the wage distribution: thus, the 10th percentile in 
the wage distribution could be lower in a locality with a more unequal wage distribution. 
Empirically, we therefore have to consider not only the distribution of wages (rather than just 
specific moments or percentiles) but also government sector wages relative to lower decile 
wages as well as the average wage.  
 Our conjecture is that, for given government salary levels, facing a more unequal private 
wage distribution increases the expected cost of engaging in corrupt behavior. In our empirical 
analysis below, we therefore include a measure of both the carrot, higher relative government 
salaries, and the stick, lower wages in alternate employment measured by the (inequality of the) 
distribution of wages and salaries. Both of these are expected to decrease corruption. 9  We 
capture the distribution of wages by an inequality measure: the Gini-coefficient for wages and 
salaries.10 The larger the Gini-coefficient, the more unequal is the wage distribution. 
 So far we have analyzed the effects of changes in the compensation schedule on the 
choice of employees already in the public sector. However, if agents differ in some intrinsic 
characteristic like honesty -- as assumed by Besley and McLaren (1993) and Ades and di Tella 
(1999) -- the compensation schedule also affects selection into the public workforce. If this is the 
                                                 
9 Note that if inequality “reduces” government wages, the effect of omitting the relative wage variable on the 
estimated effect of inequality will be to bias it in a positive direction. However, if high relative government wages 
reduce inequality, then the effect of omitting income inequality will be to bias the estimated effect of relative wages 
toward zero. In any case, empirically, there is an obvious case for simultaneously considering both relative 
government wages and income inequality. 
10 This coefficient measures the area (the sum of distances) between the Lorenz curve (the actual wage distribution) 
and the 45-degree line (the hypothetical case of equal wages). 
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case, the effects of the stick in the analysis above could differ between the short and the long run: 
In the short run, a changing compensation schedule (including outside opportunities) affects the 
moral hazard component of corruption: the calculation, conditional on being publicly employed, 
of whether to engage in corrupt behavior. In the long run, however, the compensation schedule 
affects the selection of people in and out of the public sector.  
 In this longer perspective, one might assume that positive public attitudes towards 
government and governance, which are positively correlated with support for greater equality, 
increase the relative compensation of government officials and employees. This in turn attracts 
more honest or highly-qualified people (as in Besley and McLaren, and Ades and di Tella) which 
lowers corruption and raises the quality of government (Besley 2004). A long run relationship, 
reflecting joint causation from factors like citizens’ attitude to government thus leads us to 
expect a positive correlation between lower inequality, higher government salaries, and lower 
corruption across units in the long run, the converse of the short run hypothesis regarding the 
moral hazard dimension. This is the same result, if not the same mechanism, as in the many 
cross-sectional studies cited in the Introduction. 
 The effects of wages and wage inequality considered so far have been on the supply of 
corruption. If increases in inequality are mainly driven by changes (increases) in the share of 
income received by high earners, however, this may increase the demand for corruption (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). For given public wages, this would also increase the level of corruption. In 
that case, any finding of a negative supply effect of inequality on corruption would be net of this 
positive demand effect. We evaluate this alternative explanation empirically below, using data 
specifically on highest incomes. 
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III. Data and Specification 
III.1 Specification 
The panel structure of our data allows us to investigate the effect of inequality on corruption 
convictions taking into account both invariant differences across states and common changes 
across time. The basic model that we estimate is 
 , , , ,
g w
i t i t i t i t i t t i tcorruption gini relwages X T ,β β γ μ τ= + + + + + +ε  
where corruption in state i at time t is explained by economic inequality, measured by the Gini-
coefficient, average government wages measured relative to average private sector wages, and 
additional variables contained in the X matrix, described below. In addition, we include state 
fixed effects to account for time invariant differences between states, time fixed effects to 
account for changes that affect all localities in the same way, for example changes in federal 
legislation and enforcement, and a time trend. The trend does not contribute anything in itself, as 
year effects have already been taken account of by the year fixed effects, but it helps us separate 
the trend from yearly changes. When we present our main results, we highlight the contributions 
of state and year fixed effects, respectively. We subsequently consider an alternative dynamic 
panel specification of the temporal aspects based on an error correction model, which confirms 
our inferences about the main quantities of interest. 
Throughout, we distinguish short run and long run, or cross-sectional, effects of 
inequality on corruption. We argue that in the long run inequality and corruption may move 
together due to joint causation from third factors. However, we believe there is little reason to be 
concerned about endogeneity of inequality with respect to corruption in the short run. Corruption 
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is a relatively rare occurrence in the US in the period we consider, and does not affect the income 
distribution, as might be the case if corruption were more widespread.  
III.2 Dependent variable:  Corruption convictions 
While the comparative literature on corruption uses surveys of experts and firms to construct 
corruption measures, a number of studies of corruption in the US have used data on corruption 
convictions from the Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice. Maxwell and 
Winters (2004, 2005) provide and describe in detail these annual data, aggregated to states from 
U.S. judicial districts. The Maxwell-Winters data includes some 17,000 cases between 1977 and 
2002. Early on, local cases were the most common but more recently the proportion of federal 
officials prosecuted (along with those who corrupt them) has increased.  
The Section, created by the 1977 Ethics in Government Act, reports “criminal abuses of 
public trust by government officials”. It prosecutes some cases, though most are handled by U.S. 
Attorneys. Corruption cases begin with criminal investigations which may or may not end in 
referrals to the U.S. Attorney’s office. In the last two decades 80 per cent came from the FBI. 
While only one case in three is actually prosecuted, the time from a referral to a decision to 
decline a prosecution is a year and a half, which could itself be a serious sanction. The cases are 
not on the whole petty crimes: lead charges on the largest number of indictments pursued by US 
Attorneys were based on robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce, theft and bribery in 
entities receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds, the mail fraud statute, conspiracies to 
defraud the federal government, and the RICO statute (Gordon 2008).11  
Overall, we believe these convictions data to be of high quality and comparable across 
states. Of course, in principle there is an ambiguity about convictions data. For instance, if there 
                                                 
11 The source is the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University: http://tracfed.syr.edu/.  
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was corruption in the judicial system, it would manifest itself in a low number of corruption 
convictions. We assume this is not a widespread problem in the US in the period we study, and 
we say more about issues of enforcement below.  At the same time, we also note that Alt and 
Lassen (2008) show that estimates of effects on corruption are qualitatively similar in a cross-
section when both expert ratings (of corruption and quality of governance) and data on 
convictions are available.12 
Maxwell and Winters calculate the number of convictions relative to the number of 
elected officials, as a proxy for the number of all government officials. Figure 1a first shows 
(line; measured on the left-axis) the sum across all states of the number of convictions relative to 
the number of elected officials (in 10,000s) in each state. Second (bars; measured on the right-
axis), it shows the range across states of convictions measured this way. For example, in 1989 
the sum across states was 13.7 convictions per 10,000 elected officials (corresponding to 1108 
convictions), and the convictions rate in 1989 ranges from .01 in Vermont to 1.75 in Virginia.13 
As the distribution is skewed, Maxwell and Winters’ (2005, p. 9) final measure (and our 
dependent variable in subsequent analyses) is the logarithm of convictions for corruption per 
10,000 elected officials. The average of these logged values over all years is presented in Figure 
1b, ranging from lows in Vermont and North Dakota to highs in Louisiana and Florida.  
[Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
Our sample covers the years 1977-1999 for the 48 contiguous states. Details, sources and 
a Table of summary statistics for data appear in the Appendix.   
                                                 
12 Expert data are not without their own problems. Treisman (2007) reports that for “reported experience” of 
corruption nothing else matters once income is controlled, but “reputed” corruption responds inversely to a 
country’s income, a free press, women in the labor force, and the extent of trade. The risk, of course, is that experts 
rating a country are inferring honesty from observables like a lot of trade, while people conducting that trade report 
a different experience. 
13 Others (Glaeser and Saks 2006) adjust the number of convictions by state population. We return to this in the 
robustness section below. 
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III.3 Main explanatory variables 
Gini-coefficient 
Galbraith and Hale (2006) estimate a Gini coefficient for each state and the District of Columbia 
from 1969-2004 based on Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) wage data.  For every year the 
BEA compiles data on wages and employment across dozens of industrial classifications for 
every state. Galbraith and Hale use a complicated iterative procedure of calculating a Theil-
statistic from the BEA industry- and sector-level wage data, and then fitting it to Gini 
coefficients of family income from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey yearly 
individual-level sample survey data. Galbraith and Hale report that from 1969 to 2004, the 
estimate of the Gini coefficient of family income increased for every state. The state average (not 
weighting by population) was .356 in 1969 and .427 in 2004, an average increase of 20 per cent, 
ranging from a 6 per cent increase in North Dakota to 46 per cent in Connecticut. Figure 2 shows 
the state averages and ranges by year for the period of our sample. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 also shows the trend in the share of income earned by the top decile income 
earners, averaged across states. This means, for example, that on average across states in 1996, 
the richest 10 per cent of the income distribution earned 40 per cent of total income. As is 
obvious from the figure, this share has been rising alongside the Gini coefficient, and it could, as 
noted in our theoretical discussion, be an alternative source of an increasing number of 
corruption convictions.14 
Government average and relative wage 
Data are calculated from average state and local government wages and salaries as provided by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis: “Wage and Salary Disbursements by Industry”, which was 
                                                 
14 Data on top income share is from Frank (2008). 
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also the source for construction of the Gini-coefficients. We use this to construct three useful 
variables: the average wage for state and local government, in current dollars; the ratio of the 
average state and local government wage to the average wage in the state; and the average wage 
for state and local government, in constant dollars.15 Figure 3 displays the second of these (solid 
line), the ratio of the average state and local government wage to the average wage in state. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 The third of these we use for another measure, which serves as an alternative to the Gini-
coefficient: government wages relative to the income level of the first decile, shown as a dashed 
line in figure 3. While we do not have data on the distribution of wages within sectors, we have 
data on incomes by decile. 16  To the extent that those making the calculus of corruption 
contemplate future wages at the bottom of the scale, then incomes in the lower deciles are a 
better deflator of average government wages than average private sector wages. As such, this 
measure really combines, though imperfectly, the carrot, expressed by government wages, and 
the stick, expressed by the income distribution. It does so by relating government wages to a 
more appropriate point of comparison: bottom decile rather than average wages. However, as we 
do not know the specific point of comparison for government officials in a given state in a given 
year, it complements, but does not substitute for, the income distribution measure which captures 
the relative difference between high and low incomes. 
Turnover, term limits, and the shadow of the future 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that in unstable systems the ephemeral nature of public 
positions makes officials irresponsible and grasping. In the analysis of Becker and Stigler (1974), 
the public official is always corrupt in the final period of employment unless the promise of 
                                                 
15 We calculated the correlations between average legislator compensation and these other relative wage averages. 
They are all positive. Salary data supplied by Thad Kousser.  
16  The data source is www.inequalitydata.org. Data were supplied by Andrew Gelman. See Gelman, 2008, ch. 5. 
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pensions is sufficient to keep him honest. Expected tenure in office or government employment 
thus always affects the expected present value of alternative income streams. Lacking systematic 
data on the probability of re-election of a gubernatorial administration, we look at the effect of 
having a Governor who is a lame duck (that is, in the last term of a constitutionally-allowed 
incumbency) as an indicator of a short horizon of officials or an administration. Whether the 
short tenure induces less monitoring effort by the Governor or whether it induces associates of 
the Governor (some of whom may leave public office at the same time) to value corrupt acts 
more, we expect more corruption under term-limited incumbents.17 Indeed, if incumbents subject 
to a one-term limit have worse performance than incumbents under a two-term limit (Alt, Bueno 
de Mesquita, and Rose 2008) we expect this effect to be larger in the one-term limit case. Further 
data details appear in the Appendix. 
The probability of detection: prosecutor bias and effort and enforcement  
 An important parameter in the efficiency wage framework is the risk of being caught. 
This risk depends on observability and enforcement. In US states, enforcement begins mostly 
with the FBI which is responsible for the vast majority of case referrals that begin the 
enforcement process (Gordon 2008). For our current purposes we treat relative effort across 
states as constant across years, and changes in effort from year-to-year as the same across all 
states.18 What happens if an agent’s corrupt acts are detected? He faces investigation (almost 
certainly), a considerable period (up to 18 months) of being under scrutiny while the case is 
considered (highly probable), and then possible indictment and trial (less than 50-50 overall), 
conviction or a plea deal (85%, conditional on getting here), and sentencing. Boylan (2005) 
                                                 
17 Just as ignoring the fact that those who are there longer could also be more worth bribing, using the Governor’s 
time horizon to stand for “all agents” is a necessary modeling simplification. 
18 That is, we treat FBI effort as picked up by state and year fixed effects, and we assume the latter also pick up any 
effects of changes in federal sentencing guidelines. We have been unable to ascertain anything specific about local 
FBI effort (manpower, budget) for the period we study. 
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argues that “ambitious” prosecutors seek longer sentences rather than more convictions.19 We 
have been unable to obtain systematic data on prosecutorial effort, and so empirically rely on 
year fixed effects to capture changes in federal prosecutorial effort and strategy, though 
subsequently we look briefly at possible politicization of prosecutions. 
 III.4 Other social, political, institutional factors 
Our main specification includes, in addition to the variables suggested by the model, five 
variables most often found to influence corruption in other studies of US states: average real 
income per capita, population share with college education or higher, real government 
expenditures per capita, population, and divided government. Meier and Holbrook (1992), Goel 
and Nelson (1998), Adserà et al. (2003), Boylan and Long (2003), Alt and Lassen (2003, 2008), 
and Glaeser and Saks (2006) among others find effects of income and a better educated citizenry, 
though the results are mostly cross-sectional. Other studies including Goel and Nelson (1998) 
and Alt and Lassen (2003, 2008) find higher government expenditures (or a variant thereof) per 
capita to be associated with greater corruption. In their panel Maxwell and Winters (2004) find 
over-time instability in many estimated effects, but ultimately affirm a set of more stable 
correlates including population (positive), social homogeneity (negative), and citizen education 
and engagement (negative).  
Cross-national institutional studies suggest other underlying causes including political-
civil liberty, decentralization of power, checks and balances, presidential government, 
participation, political competition, instability, electoral rules, and constraints on the chief 
executive. Many of these variables are constant across US states in the period we consider. 
Maxwell and Winters (2004) find that the number of governmental units increases corruption 
                                                 
19 This apparently increases the chance of becoming a judge or a partner in a good law firm after leaving office.  
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(more than linearly once there are more than a handful of governments20), Alt and Lassen (2008) 
show that divided government (legislature and executive controlled by different parties) in states 
is associated with lower corruption. In our sample, divided government occurs on average 45 per 
cent of the time. After increasing the first few years, it is stationary, and it is generally highly 
correlated with measures of political competition at the state level.  
In robustness analysis, we consider several more variables, though not, of course, the 
entire span of variables that have appeared in the corruption literature.21 Glaeser and Saks find 
that racial heterogeneity increases corruption, and similarly Maxwell and Winters find that social 
homogeneity reduces corruption. We consider the effects of racial heterogeneity, measured by 
the (logarithm of the) percentage of the state population which is Black. Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
find that a high share of federal transfers in revenues increases corruption.22  We consider ease of 
raising funds and fiscal decentralization, measured as the share of state revenues generated by 
federal transfers and whether or not a state had formal tax and expenditure limits in a given year, 
and also experiment with other measures like state budget process transparency (Alt, Lassen and 
Rose 2006), but do not find precise results. Finally, unobserved or unchanging factors like 
                                                 
20 This would mean that opportunities to grab dominate better monitoring when there is more decentralization. 
Nevertheless, Dincer, Ellis, and Waddell (2006) show the opposite: fiscal decentralization (measured as the local 
share of state and local expenditures) reduces corruption. 
21 For example, Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) average indices to reduce noise and factor analyze correlates to reduce 
multicollinearity. They find the closest stable and robust correlates of corruption (itself based on indices) to be a 
dozen clustered variables (rule of law, judicial independence and impartial courts, government effectiveness, GDP 
per capita, political stability, regulatory quality, bureaucratic quality, law and order, labor market regulation, 
international trade, internal conflict, and secondary school enrollment) reflecting “the capacity of government to 
regulate and enforce law.” Controlling for this factor in a version of extreme bounds analysis reveals (after 713,460 
regressions) that population density (negative for corruption), Scandinavian legal origin (negative), and ethnic 
conflict (positive) are other robust predictors, recalling the Maxwell-Winters US findings for population, social 
homogeneity, and citizen education and engagement. Other less stably correlated variables include the illiteracy rate 
(negative) or primary school enrollment (positive), the government wage (positive), dependence on fuel exports 
(positive), presidential government (negative), and female labor force participation (negative). 
22 Glaeser and Saks acknowledge that the effects of inequality and race might reflect the prominence of federal 
programs creating opportunities for corruption. They also find convergence among states over time, which might 
reflect effort to secure more convictions early on wherever corruption was most visible, stabilizing later. 
 16
“cultures” of corruption (Peters and Welch, 1978; Johnston, 1983) are subsumed by state fixed 
effects. Sources of data and further details are provided in the Appendix. 
IV. Estimation Results 
In this part we first estimate the model above including the main controls but with and without 
state and year fixed effects. We examine the reasons for the different results that come out of 
these estimations. As a consequence, we next analyze the temporal patterns, distinguishing short 
and long run effects of changes in inequality and relative wages on changes in corruption 
convictions using a dynamic panel model. The estimates are qualitatively consistent with those 
from the earlier model. Then we consider alternative measures of inequality and relative wages, 
and again the results support inferences drawn from our theoretical approach. Finally, we 
consider additional explanatory variables, including racial heterogeneity, the business cycle, 
decentralization, federal transfers, tax and expenditure limits, and budget transparency, among 
other things, as well as additional robustness issues, including alternative explanations. 
IV.1 Basic results 
Table 1 shows the results of a generic specification that we use to illustrate the main results. It 
estimates logged convictions per 10,000 elected officials in 48 states over 23 years from 1977-99. 
The first reported regression (column 1) is simply a pooled OLS omitting both year and state 
fixed effects. Columns two and three include year and state fixed effects, respectively, while the 
fourth, our main specification, includes both. Each set of fixed effects (and both sets together) is 
jointly statistically significant. Hausman tests on random effects as opposed to fixed effects 
confirm the choice of unit fixed effects, both in specifications with and without year effects. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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 In Table 1, column four, the income and inequality effects are consistent with what we 
would expect given an efficiency wage argument: the more the detected, convicted official gives 
up in terms of the benefits from an honest future and the worse the re-entry prospects after 
conviction, the fewer convictions we observe. Where the average public wage is higher, relative 
to the average private wage, there is less corruption.23 Higher income inequality also apparently 
deters corruption. To repeat, this negative effect of inequality is the opposite of what has been 
found in other literature. Both coefficients are statistically significant. Other results (not shown) 
indicate that any one or more other controls (other than the fixed effects) can be deleted from this 
regression without altering the sign or significance of these variables, The inequality result is no 
artifact, though the sign reversals between columns 1 and 4 indicate that it does depend on 
whether one is studying cross-sectional or over-time variation.  
The four “standard” controls all have expected signs: states with higher incomes and a 
more educated citizenry have, on average, less corruption, though the effect of education is not 
nearly statistically significant in this model. Larger fiscal scale (more real spending per capita) 
and a larger population both are associated with increased corruption. The latter is to some extent 
an artifact of, but at the same time controlling for, the public goods nature of some elected 
officials. That is, larger states have proportionately fewer elected officials, but supposedly a 
proportional number of public employees, than smaller states. This means that corruption 
convictions per 10,000 elected officials will tend to overstate corruption in larger states. At the 
same time, however, if larger states also mean states with major metropolitan areas (such as IL or 
NY), this in itself could be a cause of higher corruption. Including or excluding other controls 
discussed next does not make any difference to the qualitative pattern involving these four 
                                                 
23 Note that this effect of relative wages is independent of the effect of overall government spending, which goes the 
other way. That is, once one controls for the negative effect of relatively high public wages, the effect of (the rest of) 
high spending is positive, reflecting temptation. 
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variables, though significance levels go up and down.24  Corruption convictions also rise under 
term-limited incumbents, and the effect is larger for one-term lame ducks.25 Convictions fall 
when there is divided party control of government in the states. Divided party government has a 
negative effect on corruption, as in Alt and Lassen (2008), but now this effect holds up in a panel 
with an even larger set of other controls. Possibly both those results would be better cast with 
lags to allow for the two-year gap between corrupt action and conviction in most cases.26 
Relative wages has a big substantive effect. The standardized coefficient is about -.35, so 
a one standard deviation change in the relative wages of government to private employment 
reduces corruption convictions by about a third of a standard deviation.  The effect of inequality 
is even larger: the standardized coefficient is about 0.7, and this estimate allows for the fact that 
the effect of inequality is conditional on conviction, which occurs in less than a third of referrals. 
Turning to term limits, when a one-term limit binds the effect is larger (0.4) than when a two-
term limit binds (0.12) but the former is much less common than the latter in the sample (about 2 
per cent versus 18 per cent of observations).  The effect of a two-term limit is similar in 
magnitude to the effect of divided government, which is 0.08 (but occurs nearly half the time). 
IV. 2 The impact of time and state fixed effects.  
In the pooled regression of Table 1, column 1, inequality enters with a positive sign and is 
strongly significant, and a similar result obtains in repeated cross sections for each year (not 
reported). Including state and time fixed effects changes this completely: The coefficient on 
inequality is now negative and strongly significant. Such sign reversals are not uncommon, and 
                                                 
24 There are some correlations among the explanatory variables. Income, spending, and education are all correlated, 
and they and the Gini all trend upward. We return to this below. 
25 The fact that one-term limits are more common in the early period, when there are fewer corruption convictions, 
would work against our finding a positive coefficient. 
26 The incumbency variables do relate to the Governor’s whole term (usually four years) though divided government 
could change every two years if the legislature changes hands. 
 19
indeed uncovering them is one of the advantages of panel data, as Wilson and Butler (2007) 
show. Here we explore this result further, and Figure 4 is a first step: it plots the year-by-year 
averages of convictions and inequality. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
One can see two things happening in Figure 4. First, there is obvious movement from 
lower left to upper right, as both inequality and convictions increase (the ubiquitously-found 
positive relationship). Nevertheless, what is equally apparent is that from 1983-1997 
(approximately), the relationship is negative. From 1983-86 the data are moving along a 
downward-sloping line, and then both variables move out a bit. The relationship from 1987-97 
again has a downward slope, and then in the last two years the variables jointly move out again. 
This is a pattern of long-term joint movement with positive correlation, but short-term 
movements (often called feedback or error correction, see below) that go in the opposite 
direction.  
What do the estimates in the individual states look like for the relationship between 
corruption and inequality, stripped of this time pattern? If we remove the global time effects 
from the data and graph the predictions from the de-trended data by states, we get Figure 5. Each 
solid line represents the linear fit (across the range of observed data) between detrended 
convictions and inequality for an individual state. The main regression line, based on a pooled 
bivariate OLS, and shown as a dashed line, denoted LR, in Figure 5, is indeed positively sloped.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
 However, one can see that in most cases, once the effects of time on all units are taken 
away, the relationship within each unit is in fact negative. There is not really a problem with unit 
heterogeneity in this case: a look at all 48 reveals only six states (Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, North 
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Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming) with coefficients that are positive or close to zero, mostly 
at very small values of both variables. Similarly, this has nothing to do with controls: while this 
Figure is based on the regression in Table 1, deleting any or all of the controls (other than 
inequality and relative public wages!) would allow us to present the same picture. So in fact the 
impact of inequality on convictions in the short run is negative, even though in the long run other 
factors may cause both corruption and inequality to trend higher together. We explore this 
dynamic relationship in detail in the following section.  
IV.3 Short and long run effects of inequality: Dynamic panel estimation  
The combination of short-term negative and long-term positive dynamic effects – 
suggested both by Figures 4 and 5 and by the results in the two-way fixed effects model as 
opposed to the cross-sectional model – raises issues of potential error correction and 
cointegration. If any linear combination of the variables or, of course, the variables themselves, 
is stationary then an error correction model (ECM) can estimate both such long- and short-run 
effects.27   The general (panel) error correction model, which is a re-parameterization of the 
standard ADL(1,1) model, is given by 
 ( ), , , 1 ,i t i i t i i t i t i i t i ty x y X ,β φ λ μ τ−Δ = Δ + − + + + ε
                                                
 
where  is the dependent variable in state i during year t. In the most general formulation, we 
allow all slopes and intercepts to be state-specific; we return to this below. The current change in 
y is the sum of two components relating to the independent variables (as well as state fixed 
effects and common year effects, as above). First, the error correction mechanism consists of the 
,i tyΔ
 
27 Standard tests show that while superficially the series might appear to cointegrate, only the Gini-coefficient has a 
unit root while corruption is stationary. See Figures 1 and 2. However, some believe an ECM is appropriate even if 
the dependent and explanatory variables do not cointegrate (De Boef and Keele 2008).  
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equilibrium error ( ), 1 ,i t i t iy X λ− − , which is a partial correction for the extent to which the 
dependent variable deviated from the equilibrium value, corresponding to ,i i tXλ . The parameter 
iφ  captures how quickly the relationship returns to equilibrium. Second, ,i i tXβ Δ  is the direct, 
short-term effect of a change in the independent variable. Below, we refer to iλ  as the long-run 
effect and iβ  as the short-run effect.  
The panel structure presents some additional complications. In particular, a recurring 
issue in applications of the ECM in a panel context is the heterogeneity of cross sectional units, 
here states. Three overall approaches exist (see Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999): First, the 
traditional dynamic fixed effects (DFE) model pools the data, allowing only intercepts, the state 
fixed effects, to differ. Second, the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator pools the data and 
constrains the long run coefficient λ  to be the same across states, while allowing intercepts, 
short-run coefficients and error variances to differ. Finally, the mean group (MG) estimator does 
not pool the data at all, but simply averages estimates from separate state-by-state estimations. 
These models are increasingly unrestricted in the order mentioned, and thus possible to test 
against each other using Hausman-type specification tests. 
 Table 2 presents the results.28 The upper part of the table reports results for the three 
different estimators of a parsimonious specification, where gini is the only explanatory variable. 
The lower part of the table reports results for a more comprehensive specification, which 
includes additional short run control variables. For each of the restricted models is reported the 
p-value associated with a Hausman-test of the model against the MG estimator. While the MG 
estimator is consistent under both the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, the 
restricted models (PMG and DFE) are inconsistent under the alternative but efficient under the 
                                                 
28 Estimation was carried out in Stata 10, using the xtpmg-procedure developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007). 
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null. Thus, a low p-value suggests rejection of the null, i.e. that the unrestricted MG-model is 
preferred. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Throughout, we observe a positive and strongly significant long-run coefficient on 
inequality. At the same time, the estimated short-run effect of inequality is persistently negative, 
and significantly so in most specifications. The specification tests suggest a preference for the 
unrestricted MG model against the alternatives, most evidently in the parsimonious 
specifications. This means that the long-run relation between inequality and corruption is not the 
same across states. It does not mean, however, that the effects of inequality on corruption follow 
completely different patterns across states: While the MG model imposes no a priori restriction 
on parameters, a Wald-test of equality all 48 short-run coefficients resulting from the MG-
estimation strongly suggests (with a p-value of .93) that we cannot reject that the short run 
effects are identical in the MG-specification.  
Together, these results support the hypothesis that the long-run relationship is driven by 
joint causation: inequality and corruption trend together for reasons we turn to next. At the same 
time, the short run, causal effects work mainly through affecting incentives in the public 
official’s maximization problem, as we have modeled them.29 The magnitude of these strongly 
significant incentive effects (though not the underlying values of inequality) may well be the 
same across all states, and the effect is about 60 per cent larger than that estimated using our 
standard panel specification above. The standardized effect of the Gini coefficient is -1.2, 
meaning that a one standard deviation increase in inequality decreases corruption convictions by 
                                                 
29 Real per capita income and education (% with college degree) also trended strongly upwards in the period we 
consider. Including these in the long-run relation weakens the long-run result on the Gini coefficient in some 
specifications, but does not affect the short-run estimates. These two variables are never significant in the long-run 
relation. Results are available on request. 
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a half standard deviation, a considerable effect (given the larger standard deviation of the 
corruption variable due to the log-transformation). The effect of government relative wages is 
similar to that in the previous specification. 
But what about the long run effects, which differ across states? Briefly, we believe they 
combine attitudes towards government with social and institutional characteristics. The long run 
coefficients describe the covariance (proportion or disproportion) between changes in corruption 
and changes in inequality over time. There is one long run coefficient per state, and, for example, 
the long run coefficients are smaller in states that have larger metropolitan areas. This is because 
there is more corruption in metro areas, so a unit change in inequality makes less difference 
there.30 In the cross-section of states, conditional on metropolitan population, we find that the 
long run coefficient linking inequality and corruption is positively associated with a state having 
left-leaning citizens.31  There a unit change in inequality produces more corruption, perhaps 
because inequality is itself less variable. But this is describing why corruption increases more 
and less with respect to inequality in the long run, not why the two move together to begin with. 
What we can say is that causally, if inequality increases, the immediate effect is that corruption 
declines, though eventually inequality and corruption will trend together. 
IV.4 An alternative measure of relative wages 
This section estimates the panel error-correction model using our alternative, or rather composite, 
measure of relative government wages, where average government wages are compared to 
income in the bottom decile instead of average private sector wages. To highlight the 
contribution of this relative government wage measure, we consider six different specifications, 
                                                 
30 For the years that we have data, metropolitan population share within the state essentially doesn't move, so in our 
dynamic model its effect is picked up by state fixed effects. 
31 “Left-leaning”, is citizen ideology, accessed at http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm (Berry et al.  
1998). See the Appendix for details.  
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all based on the MG-estimator: Parsimonious and full specifications including the Gini-
coefficient and the relative government wage measure on their own and combined. The results 
are presented in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The top panel reports results from the parsimonious specifications. The first specification 
(1) is identical to specification (3) reported in Table 2, and included for comparison. 
Specification (2) includes the relative government wage on its own: The long run effect is 
positive and weakly significant, while the short run effect, as expected, is negative and strongly 
significant. This pattern is confirmed in the third specification, where both measures are included. 
The coefficients remain almost unchanged. The pattern continues in the bottom panel, where the 
additional explanatory variables are included, except in this case the long run effect of relative 
government wages ceases to be significant. The estimated short run effects of this definition of 
government relative wages are reasonably large: Based on specification (6) of Table 3, a one 
standard deviation increase in the relative government wage measure decreases corruption 
convictions by 0.6 standard deviations. The remaining coefficients are unchanged by the 
inclusion of the relative government wage variable.  
In additional results (not reported), we explored the relative contributions of real average 
government wages and real bottom decile income: While real average government wages are 
almost significant, the main short-run effect seems to come from income levels at the bottom 
decile: When such incomes increase, corruptions convictions increase significantly in the short-
run, as the expected income loss due to terminated employment decreases, altering the corruption 
calculus. Finally, we note that replacing income in the bottom decile with income in the second 
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or third deciles yields qualitatively similar effects, but these are generally insignificant, as was 
the relative wage measure based on average private sector wages reported in Table 2. 
IV.5 Further variables and robustness considerations 
Additional potential determinants of corruption 
There are, as noted above, many potential variables that could influence, or be associated with, 
corruption. Here, we briefly comment on a limited selection, especially those shown to be 
associated with corruption in (cross-sectional) analysis of US states. Generally, including these 
additional variables has no effect on our other estimates. An interesting result is that, in contrast 
to existing findings in Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Maxwell and Winters (2004), the proportion 
of the state population that is Black is negatively related to corruption, but with a point estimate 
less than its standard error. However, this variable has a skewed distribution. Taking the log of 
the proportion Black, this transformed variable is weakly significant. The sign reversal relative to 
existing research clearly comes from the inclusion of state fixed effects. Repeating this 
robustness exercise for the panel ECM specification produces similar results.  
 If our conjecture about the calculation of job prospects is correct, it also ought to be the 
case that in good (bad) times, when it would be easier (harder) to find alternative employment, 
the effects of inequality and relative wages should be larger (smaller), other things equal.  For a 
simple test of this we ran the model of Table 1, col. 4 in periods separated according to whether 
the state’s unemployment rate was below (good times) or above (bad) it’s average for the state. 
The coefficients of both variables were larger in good times, and the difference was statistically 
significant in the case of relative wages. This lends further support to our interpretation. 
We also examined whether the increasing share of income controlled by the richest decile, 
shown in Figure 2, is a cause of corruption, either jointly with or instead of inequality and 
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relative government wages. The evidence does not support this in any way. In the standard panel 
data model, top decile income enters with a negative sign, but is smaller than its standard error. 
In the dynamic panel (error-correction) model, it enters with a positive sign but remains 
insignificant, without altering results for inequality and relative government wages. Further, like 
top decile incomes, we find no evidence that ease of funds, measured by per capita federal grants 
and/or tax and expenditure limits, have significant effects on corruption, and the same holds for 
measures of fiscal transparency. Finally, various state level measures of ideology and 
partisanship, which could be correlated with inequality, were never significant and did not affect 
other estimates. Political variables could affect convictions, though, through politicization of the 
prosecution decision; we turn to this next. 
Politics in the short run: politicization 
Richard Posner (blog) wrote in August 2005:  
“Another factor is that most big cities have Democratic mayors …. Republican 
attorneys-general are more likely to investigate and prosecute public corruption in 
Democratic-controlled cities than Democratic attorneys-general are.”  
In the corruption convictions data we study, referrals mostly pass through the offices of U.S. 
Attorneys. The recent controversy over U.S. Attorney firings reminds us that their appointment 
and behavior may be politicized.32 We lack data for a systematic investigation, but we can look 
for evidence that changes of partisanship across Presidential administrations alter prosecutorial 
effort in the way Posner and Gordon suggest. 
                                                 
32 As Gordon (2008) shows, if corruption convictions are “political” and politics is partisan, U.S. Attorneys in 
Republican (Democratic) administrations will have more desire to “go after” elected Democrats (Republicans) 
and/or their bureaucratic agents. This has two effects: it inhibits the choice of corruption by the “target” but 
increases pursuit of the case (conditional on corruption being chosen) by the “enforcer”. There are conditions under 
which each effect dominates, but,the comparative statics of Gordon’s model are for sentence severity. We also lack 
the partisan affiliation of the convicted official in most cases, though biographical research could in principle 
determine the partisanship of the President appointing the judge in each case in the Tracfed (post-1986) data. 
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 There is indeed a little such evidence, but very little. We use Berry et al.’s (1998) 
institutional ideology (updated to 2006) as a measure of broad state-level political orientation: 
the question is whether after Bill Clinton (George W. Bush) became President, the volume of 
cases referred or pursued decreased (increased) disproportionately in more liberal areas. We base 
the investigation on comparisons of the two years before and after the transition.33 First we look 
at referrals or cases processed in the Clinton transition: relative to 1991-92, more liberal areas 
saw significantly more cases processed in 1993-94. This is the opposite of what would be 
expected if detection and referral were politicized. Once a case is referred, of the cases processed 
in any year, U.S. Attorneys choose to file charges in some and decline to in others: think of this 
ratio of (charges filed/cases processed) as reflecting prosecutorial “effort”. In the case of the 
Clinton administration, U.S. Attorneys in 1993-94 filed slightly more cases relative to 1991-92, 
but not nearly as many more as were referred, so effort in 1993-94 (relative to 1991-92 in the 
same locale) certainly declined relatively more in more liberal areas. In simple regressions 
(results not shown), the interaction of ideology and lagged effort is negative and more than twice 
its standard error.34   
The Bush transition reveals similarities and differences. Referrals are disproportionately 
(and significantly) up in liberal areas, as they were eight years earlier, though this time the result 
appears consistent with partisan politicization. However, U.S. Attorneys do not respond with 
more filings where there are more cases, so effort appears to decline where (in ideological terms) 
it should increase. Of course, perhaps 2001-2 are not good years to study: maybe investigations 
                                                 
33 Ideology data was accessed at http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm. We lack data for the Carter-
Reagan transition, since the Tracfed data begin in 1986. The section summarizes results from a variety of 
specifications involving different lags and time periods, changes in Congressional as well as Presidential control, 
and alternative measures of local partisanship. 
34  However, we cannot reject the counterhypothesis that workload expanded faster than capacity to file charges, 
leading to the apparent decline in effort. 
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increased for reasons unrelated to domestic corruption. By 2003-4 the ideological bias has 
disappeared from cases referred, relative to 1999-2000, but charges filed go up, and so 
prosecutorial effort appears politicized in exactly the way a reader of Posner would expect.35 In 
any case, we draw three inferences from this investigation:  first, though teasing out better data 
would involve a lot of work, it might well be worth it;36 second, the results are tantalizing but 
mixed; and finally, the mixed results make it unlikely that our model is fundamentally 
misspecified because it omits partisan political factors. 
Alternative variable definitions and specifications 
In their cross-sectional analysis, Glaeser and Saks (2006) adjust the number of corruption 
convictions by state population instead of the number of elected officials. If we do the same, we 
get qualitatively similar results in both the standard and dynamic panel specifications, except for 
population as an independent variable. If anything, the results for inequality are stronger using 
this adjustment. The ranking of states shown in Figure 1b changes somewhat using this 
alternative deflator, but the overall grouping of states does not. 
As a robustness check, we also consider Langer’s (1999) annual estimates of state Gini 
coefficients of household income from 1976 to 1995 using CPS data. The Langer estimates do 
not quite cover our sample period. They are very volatile, and Galbraith and Hale report that the 
average time series correlation for states between their measure that uses industrial sector data 
and Langer’s is .58. Nevertheless, the effect of inequality remains negative, and is weakly 
significant in the parsimonious dynamic panel data specification, but not significant when 
                                                 
35  The coefficient of the interaction term is 1.9 times its standard error. However, any apparent ideological bias in 
effort fades out in 2005-6. Maybe that is why some U.S. Attorneys were subsequently fired! 
36  Some states (for example, Illinois or New York) contain multiple judicial districts with very different political 
characteristics, so further disaggregation might pay off. 
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including all controls. However, if we use a Gini coefficient derived from the same source as the 
bottom decile income (www.inequalitydata.org), inequality is negative and strongly significant.  
Experimentation with sub-period estimation in the dynamic panel data specification 
reveals no important qualitative changes regarding the short run results if the earlier period 
(years before 1991) is considered separately. Many of the effects, including long-run results on 
inequality, reduce or flatten out if only more recent years (since 1983) are considered. 
Experimentation with lags on the decision variables reveals that lags of one or two years to the 
Gini coefficient make little difference, but the government relative wages variable is less stable. 
V. Concluding Summary 
Dramatically better data on state-level inequality and incomes, the use of panel data on 
corruption convictions, and careful attention to time dynamics as well as the consequences of 
including or excluding state fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the 
impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Our main findings 
from panel data regressions show that higher income inequality and higher public relative to 
average as well as lower-than-average private wages (a better outcome if the agent stays on the 
right side of the law) both deter corruption, at least in the short run. Following efficiency wage 
arguments, we show that in the 48 contiguous states over nearly a quarter of a century, where 
average government wages were higher relative to private wages, so that public officials had 
more to lose in lifetime income terms by losing their jobs, corruption was lower. At the same 
time, where local inequality was higher, corruption was also lower, other things equal, because 
those convicted of corruption faced poorer prospects from probably re-entering private life 
toward the bottom of the income scale. We do not interpret that as a defense of inequality. Rather, 
we see it as a caution to those who might have believed that reducing inequality would reduce 
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corruption: our finding reinterprets and in some ways reverses an established literature on the 
usually-assumed-to-be-positive relationship between inequality and corruption. We argue that 
this positive association arises from joint causation by unobserved factors rather than because of 
a theoretical relationship in which higher inequality causes more corruption.  
That higher government wages relative to average private sector wages deters corruption 
was known from the cross-national literature (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), but the 
results for both inequality and lower-than-average wages are novel and stronger, and turn out to 
be the result of paying attention to time dynamics and state fixed effects rather than some special 
features of the data. While we observe in any given year a positive relationship between 
inequality and corruption convictions, accounting for time trends or year effects and, most 
importantly, state fixed effects, results in the opposite conclusion, with more inequality leading 
to fewer corruption convictions. These results hold up independently of other political and 
economic factors that affect corruption in American states, like the effects of checks and 
balances described in Alt and Lassen (2008), and the results are statistically significant and 
reasonably sizeable. Additional empirical analyses based on panel error-correction models 
confirm this pattern. In the short run, higher wage inequality decreases corruption convictions, 
but in the long run, inequality and corruption have a positive co-movement, possibly due to joint 
causation from factors such as citizens’ views of government. 
At the same time this result fits comfortably into the earlier literature in that many past 
findings continue to hold. Income and education reduce, and population and fiscal scale increase 
corruption. Divided government, at least in its party control of separated branches form, appears 
associated with lower corruption despite all these other consideration. Term limits, often held 
responsible for poor political performance, appear to be associated with higher corruption. Our 
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results also suggest how consequences of omitted variable bias may explain some other 
discrepancies in the findings among papers. For example, bear in mind that we estimate negative 
effects on corruption from income and government relative wages, but a positive effect for 
government expenditure (fiscal scale). Since income is generally positively correlated with fiscal 
scale, omitting fiscal scale from a corruption regression (as many do) could bias the estimated 
income effect toward zero. Similarly, if a higher relative government wage increases the scale of 
government (likely), omitting the government relative wage variable could bias the estimated 
fiscal scale effect toward zero. For these and other possible determinants, like the mixed results 
on politicization, opportunities to do more research await. 
Finally, how general are our results? Several things distinguish our sample from a broad 
cross-section of countries: higher incomes, the serious nature of the offenses, unlike the 
ubiquitous petty corruption reported elsewhere, and omnipresent enforcement, without which our 
model does not work. In the literature there is more or less a consensus that democracy reduces 
corruption, especially when democracy is synonymous with other related variables like freedom 
of the press and the rule of law (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). We see no obvious reason that, 
conditional on the presence of democracy or the rule of law which proxy for enforcement, other 
effects like those of government wages and inequality on corruption should not appear in a cross-
national analysis. Finding out whether that is right is a challenge that remains before us. 
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A. Data appendix 
 
 
Corruption Convictions: The Public Integrity Section of the US Department of Justice (Maxwell 
and Winters 2004, 2005) reports “criminal abuses of public trust by government officials”, based 
primarily on reports from U.S. Attorney offices. Originally the statute mandated reporting such 
abuses by elected officials, but individual cases reported in detail make it clear that the reports 
include non-elected public officials as well and others involved in corrupting them. The Section, 
created by the 1977 Ethics in Government Act, prosecutes some cases, but the great majority of 
cases are prosecuted by U. S. Attorneys. The 1983 Report of the Public Integrity Sections notes a 
change in the reporting and counting practice, notably including lower level employees, which 
caused in increase in the number of convictions from then on. These changes are subsumed by 
the year fixed effects. 
From 1986 on more detailed data is available by judicial district at tracfed.syr.edu. Data 
on individual cases can be retrieved, offering the possibility of breaking down cases by the level 
of official involved within districts and states, as well as referrals, charges filed, and cases 
declined. The data here are a subset of the Public Integrity data, and it is not clear what causes 
the differences. The number of filings from the Tracfed data and the number of convictions from 
the Public Integrity Sections has a correlation coefficient of .74. Total number of referrals equal 
filings and declinations as reported by Tracfed. Effort equals filings divided by referrals. In 
1993-94, referred to in the text, the average number of referrals across states was 37.9 (sd 45.0), 
ranging from 0 to 231. Average effort was .30, ranging from 0 to 1. 
Elected officials: Data on the number of popularly elected state and local officials for the years 
1977, 1987, and 1992 used in the calculation are from Table 2 of Volume 1, no. 2, "Popularly 
Elected Officials" of the U.S. Census Bureau, 1992 Census of Governments. These are available 
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at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog92.html. Data for the intervening years were 
interpolated by averaging over time. Since numbers reported by the Section evidently include 
non-elected officials and some non-officials it is in fact not an entirely correct deflation. 
Inequality: See main text for definitions, sources and explanations. 
Relative wages: We use the BEA data, which are in current dollars for state and local 
government employees (in total, and from 1979- by state and local separately), adjusted by “Full 
time and part time wage and salary employment” for the same categories, to calculate the  
average wage in current dollars of state and local government employees.37 To be in real terms, 
we adjusted this for inflation using the regional CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, divided 
into West, Midwest, Northeast and South. We also obtained in a similar way the average wage 
and salary disbursements by state, to compare with public sector wages.  
Real per capita income, government expenditures and federal transfers: Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, various years 
Divided government and tax and expenditure limits: The Book of the States, various years. 
Education: Bureau of the Census.  
Population: State Politics & Policy Data Resource, http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/datasets.shtml 
Term limits: Data from Alt et al. (2008). For the whole sample period 14 states had no 
gubernatorial term limits, 18 states had two-term limits, and one state, VA, had a one-term limit 
throughout. Seven further states began with one-term limits but switched to two-term limits, 
while eight further states switched from no to two-term limits, The last group all switched in the 
early 1990s. The breakdown of states is as follows:   
States with no effective term limits during the sample period: CT, ID, IL, IA, MA, MN, 
NH, NY, ND, TX, UT, VT, WA, WI.  
                                                 
37 Part timers are problematic, and we omit them. 
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States with 2-term limits: AL, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, ME, MD, MO, NE, NV, NJ, OH, OK, 
OR, PA, SD, and WV.  
States switching within the sample period from 1- to 2-term limits (with year of switch): 
GA (1976), KY (1994), MS (1994), NM (1990), NC (1977), SC (1980), and TN (1978). 
States switching within the sample period from no to 2-term limits (with year). AZ 
(1992), AR (1992), CA (1990), CO (1990), MI (1992), MT (1992), RI (1994), and WY 
(1992) 
Racial composition: Data up to 1990 was provided by Tim Besley, updated with annual 
estimates from the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. See for instance 
http://www.jointcenter.org/. 
Fiscal transparency: Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006). 
Ideology: Berry et al.’s (1998) measures of citizens and government ideology, 0 (conservative) - 
100 (liberal). For the years 1993-94 referred to in the text, the average of the government 
ideology variable was 52.9 (sd equal 22.3), ranging from 1.7 to 93.0. 
[Table A.1 about here] 
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
N Mean SD min max
Raw number of convictions 1088 14.89 22.29 0 155.00
Log(number of convictions per 10,000 elected officials) 1103 -3.14 2.50 -9.86 0.76
Gini coefficient 1104 0.39 0.02 0.33 0.48
Government wages relative to average wage 1104 0.97 0.07 0.78 1.17
Government wages relative to bottom decile income 1104 1.03 0.16 0.65 1.61
Divided government 1104 0.45 0.50 0 1
Real income per capita (1,000 $) 1104 23.32 4.05 14.76 40.59
Real government expenditures per capita (1,000 $) 1104 4.08 0.89 2.40 7.37
College educated, per cent 1104 18.94 4.79 10.30 34.98
Population, millions 1104 5.07 5.30 0.41 33.15
Binding one-term limit 1104 0.06 0.24 0 1
Binding two-term limit 1104 0.20 0.40 0 1
Log(number of convictions per million population) 1088 -1.00 4.44 -11.51 3.09
Black population, per cent 1104 0.11 0.09 0 0.37
Real per capita federal grants received 1104 835.73 230.02 443.87 1958.29
Tax and expenditure limits 1104 0.39 0.49 0 1
Fiscal Transparency index 1104 0.45 0.19 0 1
Share of income received by top decile 1104 0.36 0.04 0.28 0.51
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Table 1: Determinants of corruption convictions per 10,000 elected officials, 1977-1999
Pooled OLS Year FEs State FEs State and Year FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini index 41.758 34.998 8.879 -26.999
[2.634]*** [3.257]*** [11.277] [11.585]**
Relative government wages 2.424 0.777 6.315 -5.038
[1.078]** [1.118] [2.545]** [3.914]
Divided government -0.311 -0.385 -0.129 -0.194
[0.130]** [0.129]*** [0.142] [0.124]
Real per capita income (1000$) 0.194 0.190 -0.026 -0.147
[0.033]*** [0.034]*** [0.085] [0.086]*
Real per capita gov expentitures (1000$) -0.420 -0.419 0.252 0.511
[0.112]*** [0.115]*** [0.313] [0.297]*
Percent college graduates or higher -0.091 -0.129 0.072 -0.036
[0.029]*** [0.033]*** [0.056] [0.083]
Population (millions) 0.076 0.090 0.053 0.138
[0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.084] [0.071]*
Binding one-term limit 1.129 1.315 0.760 0.995
[0.218]*** [0.251]*** [0.532] [0.427]**
Binding two-term limit 0.529 0.555 0.305 0.305
[0.151]*** [0.150]*** [0.206] [0.191]
Year effects and time trend No Yes*** No Yes***
State fixed effects No No Yes*** Yes***
Observations 1103 1103 1103 1103
R-squared 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.19
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Significance levels for fixed effects relate to test of joint significance.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
Calculation carried out in Stata 10.0 using reg and xtreg.  
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Table 2: Dynamic panel error-correction estimates of corruption convictions and inequality
Long-run coefficient (λ) 28.23 *** 20.45 *** 55.01 ***
(5.07) (2.04) (13.13)
Adjustment parameter (φ) -0.83 *** -0.81 *** -0.91 ***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Short-run coefficient (β): Gini -29.18 ** -16.31 -44.07 ***
(14.16) (15.99) (14.50)
p-value, Hausman test
against MG estimator1)
No. of states
No. of observations
Long-run coefficient (λ) 13.25 ** 13.84 *** 36.56 ***
(6.06) (2.05) (12.29)
Adjustment parameter (φ) -0.84 *** -0.95 *** -1.05 ***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Short-run coefficients (β):
Gini -29.07 ** -26.52 -48.55 **
(14.55) (20.19) (19.99)
Relative government wages -3.90 -4.71 -5.09
   (to average wages) (4.08) (6.31) (6.51)
Divided government -0.22 -0.54 * -0.45
(0.15) (0.32) (0.31)
Real income per capita 0.26 * 0.61 *** 0.52 **
(0.15) (0.23) (0.25)
Real gov. exp. per capita 0.45 0.52 0.42
(0.60) (0.90) (0.90)
College educated -0.58 *** -1.03 ** -1.48 **
(0.17) (0.42) (0.72)
Population (mill.) 0.02 -26.17 ** -21.32 **
(0.55) (12.42) (9.91)
p-value, Hausman test 0.095 0.142
against MG estimator1)
No. of states
No. of observations
1)  H0: No difference between restricted (DFE and PMG) and unrestricted (MG) model.
    See text for details.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Calculation carried out in Stata 10.0 using xtpmg.
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Table 3: Dynamic panel error-correction estimates of corruption convictions, 
inequality and relative government wages
Long-run coefficient (λ)
   Gini 55.01 *** 64.03 ***
(13.13) (14.21)
   Relative government wages 3.51 * 3.19 *
     (to lowest decile income) (1.82) (1.93)
Adjustment parameter (φ) -0.91 *** -0.86 *** -1.03 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Short-run coefficient (β)
   Gini -44.07 *** -57.03 ***
(14.50) (14.09)
   Relative government wages -4.18 ** -4.79 **
     (to lowest decile income) (2.04) (2.29)
p-value, Hausman test 0.500
against PMG estimator1)
No. of states
No. of observations
Long-run coefficient (λ)
   Gini 46.00 ** 44.33 **
(15.94) (13.13)
   Relative government wages 1.89 2.78
     (to lowest decile income) (2.77) (2.98)
Adjustment parameter (φ) -1.05 *** -1.04 *** -1.16 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Short-run coefficients (β):
   Gini -57.10 *** -63.23 ***
(17.40) (24.46)
   Relative government wages -11.30 *** -9.26 **
     (to lowest decile income) (3.75) (4.14)
   Divided government -0.49 -0.51 -0.27
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30)
   Real income per capita 0.52 ** 0.49 ** 0.33
(0.25) (0.24) (0.27)
   Real gov. exp. per capita 0.42 1.18 1.27
(0.87) (1.11) (1.31)
   College educated -1.32 ** -1.24 *** -1.40 ***
(0.64) (0.34) (0.61)
   Population (mill.) -23.02 ** -12.42 -11.12
(10.62) (13.43) (12.95)
p-value, Hausman test
against MG estimator1)
No. of states
No. of observations
1)  H0: No difference between restricted (PMG) and unrestricted (MG) model.
    See text for details.
A constant was included in all regressions, but results are not reported.
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Calculations carried out in Stata 10.0 using xtpmg.
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 Figure 1a: Corruption convictions by year, 1977-1999  
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Figure 1b: Corruption convictions by state, 1977-2000 
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Figure 2:  Range and average of Gini coefficients and top decile income shares, by year 
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Figure 3: Ratio of average state and local government wage to the average wage and lowest 
decile total income, by year  
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Figure 4 Convictions and Inequality, annual averages 
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Figure 5: Within-state regressions of detrended convictions on inequality 
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